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Fault and Punishment under
Sections 7 and 12 of the Charter
Jamie Cameron

I. ANTONIO LAMER, THE MOTOR VEHICLE REFERENCE AND THE
CRIMINAL LAW
Antonio Lamer took the lead, following the arrival of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms,1 in constitutionalizing the substantive
criminal law. Justice Lamer, who died recently, was a puisne judge from
1980 to 1990 and chief justice of Canada from 1990 to the end of 1999.
It is common ground that his enduring contributions to the Charter are
found in the criminal law jurisprudence, and many point to the Motor
Vehicle Reference as his most important opinion.2 There, he sidelined
the Charter’s drafters and granted section 7 a substantive interpretation.
Not only did the MVR create a relationship between the Charter and the
substantive criminal law, the decision became a jurisprudential lightning
rod for debate about review.
The Court’s decision provoked a negative reaction from skeptics who
feared that an empowered judiciary might invoke section 7 to substitute
its policy preferences for those of the legislature. That may be why
Lamer J. granted the guarantee a substantive interpretation but limited
review to matters arising in the justice system. The constraints he proposed

Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. I would like to thank
Ben Berger for his insightful comments, some of which I was unable to address in the scope of this
paper. I would also like to thank Ms. Megan McLeese (LL.B. 2009) for assisting me in the research
for this paper.
1
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “the Charter”].
2
Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]
2 S.C.R. 486 (S.C.C.) (hereinafter “MVR”). In my opinion, the MVR was Lamer J.’s most important
opinion. See also D. Stuart, “Chief Justice Antonio Lamer: An Extraordinary Judicial Record of
Reform of the Canadian Judicial System” (2000) 5 Can. Crim. L. Rev. 51, at 52 (describing Lamer J.
as “the judge who has undoubtedly stamped his mark on our criminal justice system in a fashion
unparalleled in Canadian history”). Stuart listed Lamer J.’s top 12 pronouncements on criminal
justice issues and stated that the MVR “may well have been his most important and most activist
judgment”. Ibid.
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were designed to assuage those who were apprehensive that the Court
would engage in unbounded review under section 7.
There is much to commend in Lamer J.’s conception of the guarantee.
A focus on the justice system played to section 7’s status as the flagship
in the Charter’s fleet of legal rights.3 Those who advocate the rights of
the accused had little difficulty with the Court’s conclusion in the MVR4
that, when combined, absolute liability and imprisonment violate the
Charter. In saying so, the MVR invoked the Court’s iconic decision in
R. v. Sault Ste. Marie (City)5 and did not appear — on its face — to
bring the judiciary inexorably into clash with the legislative branches.
For those less concerned with the criminal law, what mattered was the
MVR’s declaration that policy questions were strictly out of bounds for
review under section 7.
Having realized that his decision was open to challenge, Lamer J.
maintained that as long as section 7’s content was stolidly fixed in the
institutions of the justice system, review would not break the legitimacy
barrier and stray into the forbidden realm of public policy. This claim
depended, for its soundness, on two assumptions. First, Lamer J. claimed
that the Court could circumvent the substance-procedure distinction by
relying, instead, on a dichotomy between justice and policy. As presented,
this dichotomy simply described the conventional hegemony of institutional
roles: the courts would address questions of justice and the legislatures
would remain solely responsible for policy choices. Second, Lamer J.
assumed that his reading of the guarantee would limit review to the
institutions of the justice system. Under the keen sense of institutional
mandate he outlined in the MVR,6 review would not, and could not, be
co-opted.
It did not take long for Justice Lamer’s concept of section 7 to break
down. The MVR’s7 foundational distinction between justice and policy
dissolved when the Court realized that it was impossible to constitutionalize
the criminal law without undercutting Parliament’s policy choices. A
trio of decisions which addressed the fault element — the MVR, R. v.
3
Section 7 states: “Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the
right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.”
4
Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]
2 S.C.R. 486 (S.C.C.).
5
[1978] 2 S.C.R. 1299 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Sault Ste. Marie”].
6
Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]
2 S.C.R. 486 (S.C.C.).
7
Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]
2 S.C.R. 486 (S.C.C.).
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Vaillancourt,8 and R. v. Martineau9 — energized the section 7
jurisprudence but failed to generate enduring momentum to reform the
criminal law. Beyond these landmarks, the Court applied the Charter in
only two other substantive instances: R. v. Daviault10 and R. v. Ruzic.11
If anything, the early decisions which endorsed a minimum mens rea
convinced the Court to go no further with the constitutionalization of fault.
In due course it also became difficult to defend a theory of review
that made the criminal law a favourite of the Charter. At least to some, it
was not credible for the MVR12 to target injustices in the legal system
and to exclude all other forms of injustice from section 7. Against the
force of that view, Lamer J. struggled in vain to forestall a broader
interpretation from taking root in the jurisprudence.13 Once the entitlements
clause drifted away from a narrow definition — one grounded in physical
liberty, or a “corporeal” concept of the person, as he described it 14 —
the Court became unwilling to restrict section 7’s application to the
administration of justice.
By the time Lamer C.J.C. retired at the end of 1999, the Court had
all but abandoned the core of his centrepiece decision. Within the justice
system, the constitutionalization of the substantive criminal law was —
and to this day remains — stymied.15 Not only that, the Court has
8

[1987] S.C.J. No. 83, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 636 (S.C.C.).
[1990] S.C.J. No. 84, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 633 (S.C.C.).
10
[1994] S.C.J. No. 77, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 63 (S.C.C.).
11
[2001] S.C.J. No. 25, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 687 (S.C.C.). Although the Court invalidated
Parliament’s scheme for therapeutic abortions in R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] S.C.J. No. 1, [1988]
1 S.C.R. 30 (S.C.C.), only Wilson J., writing alone, adopted a substantive interpretation of the
guarantee. See also R. v. Hess; R. v. Nguyen, [1990] S.C.J. No. 91, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 906 (S.C.C.)
(invalidating the former s. 146(1) of the Criminal Code, which had been replaced before the case
was heard); R. v. Morales, [1992] S.C.J. No. 98, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 711 (S.C.C.) (invalidating a bail
provision on vagueness grounds, under s. 7, rather than under s. 11(e), which guarantees the right
not to be denied reasonable bail without just cause); and R. v. Hebert, [1990] S.C.J. No. 64, [1990]
2 S.C.R. 151 (S.C.C.) (recognizing a right to remain silent under s. 7).
12
Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]
2 S.C.R. 486 (S.C.C.).
13
See Wilson J.’s concurring opinion in R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] S.C.J. No. 1, [1988]
1 S.C.R. 30 (S.C.C.) (proposing a broad and generous definition of liberty of the person under s. 7).
14
B. (R.) v. Children’s Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto, [1994] S.C.J. No. 24, [1995]
1 S.C.R. 315, at 346-47 [hereinafter “CAS”].
15
But see R. v. Ruzic, [2001] S.C.J. No. 25, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 687 (S.C.C.) (invalidating
elements of the definition of duress in the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46). See also R. v.
Latimer, [2001] S.C.J. No. 1, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) (declining to grant a defence of necessity
or grant a s. 12 claim); R. v. Malmo-Levine, [2003] S.C.J. No. 79, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571 (S.C.C.)
(refusing to endorse the harm principle and constitutionalize elements of the actus reus); Canadian
Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v. Canada (Attorney General), [2004] S.C.J. No. 6,
9
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undertaken what the MVR16 forbade, and recognized claims arising outside
the administration of justice.17 Even though Antonio Lamer could not
mobilize enduring support for his conception of section 7, his opinions
created a strong relationship between the Charter and the substantive
criminal law. For that reason, exploring his criminal law legacy is an
important backdrop, but not the main purpose of this paper. Examining
the interaction between the Charter and the substantive criminal law
under section 7 is its more pressing objective. Specifically, the question is
whether the MVR’s18 decision to grant section 7 a substantive interpretation
can still be defended.
Despite the seemingly innocuous circumstances of the MVR,19 the
decision to grant the guarantee a substantive interpretation flushed diverse
views about the boundaries of review into the open. 20 More than 20
years later there is little agreement, both inside the Court and among
commentators, about section 7’s purposes. This may explain, in part,
why the jurisprudence has become such an unwholesome jumble of tests
and doctrines.21 Meanwhile, some have not forgotten the intent of the
drafters, which would restrict the guarantee to questions of procedure.22
[2004] 1 S.C.R. 76 (S.C.C.) (concluding that s. 43 of the Criminal Code does not violate s. 7’s
principles of fundamental justice).
16
Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]
2 S.C.R. 486 (S.C.C.).
17
See Godbout v. Longueuil (City), [1997] S.C.J. No. 95, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 844 (S.C.C.)
(invalidating a residence requirement, as a condition of employment, per La Forest J.’s plurality
opinion, under s. 7 of the Charter); Winnipeg Child and Family Services v. W. (K.L.), [2007] S.C.J.
No. 48, [2000] 2. S.C.R. 519 (S.C.C.) (adjudicating a s. 7 claim not arising in the administration of
justice); Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2002] S.C.J. No. 85, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 429 (S.C.C.)
(endorsing an entitlement to welfare benefits under s. 7, per Arbour J. in dissent); and Chaoulli v.
Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] S.C.J. No. 33, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791 (S.C.C.) (invalidating a
health care regulation which lacked any connection to the administration of justice, in a plurality
opinion by McLachlin C.J.C. and Major J., under s. 7 of the Charter).
18
Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]
2 S.C.R. 486 (S.C.C.).
19
Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]
2 S.C.R. 486 (S.C.C.).
20
For an early criticism of the decision, see J. Cameron, “The Motor Vehicle Reference and
the Relevance of American Doctrine in Charter Adjudication” in R. Sharpe, ed., Charter Litigation
(Toronto: Butterworths, 1987), at 69.
21
See J. Cameron, “From the MVR to Chaoulli v. Quebec: The Road Not Taken and the
Future of Section 7” (2006) 34 S.C.L.R. (2d) 105 (tracing the history of the jurisprudence and
analyzing the Court’s serial and overlapping approaches to s. 7’s principles of fundamental justice).
22
See M. Stephens, “Fidelity to Fundamental Justice: An Originalist Construction of Section 7
of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms” (2002) 13 N.J.C.L. 183 and S. Choudhry, “The
Lochner Era and Comparative Constitutionalism” (2004) 2(1) Int’l. J. Const. Law 1, at 16-27
(discussing the dynamics which surrounded the drafting of s. 7).
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Even among those who favour a substantive interpretation, there is little
consensus on the scope and content of the guarantee. Though Lamer J.’s
focus on the justice system has supporters, others propose a mandate for
section 7 which would empower the Court to enforce social and economic
entitlements, and to impose positive obligations on the government. At
the moment, section 7’s future is desperately unclear.
On other issues the Supreme Court has recently indicated that it is
prepared to consider the Charter’s early landmarks 23 and to resolve
unsettled questions. 24 The next section follows that lead and explains
why section 7 is ripe for reconsideration. After analyzing the guarantee’s
journey, it concludes that the Court should not have granted this provision
a substantive interpretation in the MVR.25 In light of that view, the
discussion presents an argument that section 7 should return to its
prelapsarian state — one which rejects substantive review and re-trains
the guarantee’s attention on procedural issues. More than 20 years after
a substantive interpretation has been accepted and conceded, this suggestion
is not lightly or easily made. Any decision not to follow the MVR would
eliminate review of social and economic policies and potentially leave
defects in the substantive criminal law without a remedy. A proposal
which will surely encounter resistance can be defended on two grounds.
The first is that what is lost in the way of Charter protection will be
more than offset by what is gained: a return to principle in constitutional
interpretation. Second, the consequences for the substantive law need
not be so draconian. In suggesting that the MVR now be abandoned, the
paper proposes an alternative to section 7, in the case of the substantive
criminal law, and that is section 12’s prohibition against cruel and unusual
treatment or punishment.
Up to now, a small number of decisions have given this guarantee
an inhibited interpretation which has obscured its potential.26 For reasons
23
See Health Services and Support – Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. British Columbia,
[2007] S.C.J. No. 27, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 391 (S.C.C.) (overruling the Court’s landmark decisions
excluding collective bargaining and the right to strike from s. 2(d) , and adopting a broader
interpretation of the guarantee which constitutionalizes the process of collective bargaining in the
public sector).
24
See R. v. Ferguson, [2008] S.C.J. No. 6, 2008 SCC 6 (S.C.C.) (concluding, after a long
period of uncertainty, that constitutional exemptions are an unprincipled form of relief and
unavailable for that reason).
25
Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]
2 S.C.R. 486 (S.C.C.).
26
A short list, for purposes of this paper, includes decisions which address the constitutionality
of the sentence: R. v. Smith, [1987] S.C.J. No. 36, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045 (S.C.C.); R. v. Luxton,
[1990] S.C.J. No. 87, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 711 (S.C.C.); R. v. Goltz, [1991] S.C.J. No. 90, [1991] 3 S.C.R.
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relating to its text and history, section 12 has made no more than a
modest contribution to the jurisprudence of the Charter and criminal
justice.27 Though claims rarely succeed, this paper does not challenge the
“disproportionality” principle or advance doctrinal reforms which would
provide relief from sentences which are impermissibly harsh. Rather,
the discussion focuses on the link between the Court’s section 7 and
section 12 jurisprudence, and concludes that the decisions under these
guarantees essentially addressed the same issue: the relationship between
fault and punishment. Under section 7, the Court found that offences
which attenuated the mental element were unconstitutional when the
punishment was disproportionate to fault. Meantime, the section 12
jurisprudence confirms that punishment cannot be imposed in the absence
of fault, when to do so would offend the principle of proportionality.
This common bond suggests that a substantive interpretation of section
7 may not be the only check on the attenuation of fault. The final section
of the paper pursues that logic by presenting an argument that section 12
can fill the gap which would arise should the Court reinstate a procedural
interpretation of section 7. Review on policy matters would not be avoided,
but would be focused and narrowed in ways that are not possible under the
MVR.28 This solution would preserve the integrity of the MVR’s concern
about the relationship between fault and punishment, and eliminate the
kind of substantive review under section 7 which brought the courts too
frontally into “the realm of general public policy”.29

485 (S.C.C.); R. v. Morrisey, [2000] S.C.J. No. 39, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 90 (S.C.C.); R. v. Latimer,
[2001] S.C.J. No. 1, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.); and R. v. Ferguson, [2008] S.C.J. No. 6, 2008 SCC
6 (S.C.C.). See also R. v. Arkell, [1990] S.C.J. No. 86, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 695 (S.C.C.) (upholding the
first degree murder provision in the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, under s. 7 of the
Charter); R. v. Pontes, [1995] S.C.J. No. 70, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 44 (S.C.C.) (confirming that
imprisonment without fault violates s. 7); Kindler v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [1991] S.C.J. No. 63,
[1991] 2 S.C.R. 779 (S.C.C.), and Reference re Ng Extradition (Canada), [1991] S.C.J. No. 64,
[1991] 2 S.C.R. 858 (S.C.C.) (considering the constitutionality of extradition to face the death
sentence).
27
For background see W. Tarnopolsky, “Just Deserts or Cruel and Unusual Treatment or
Punishment? Where Do We Look for Guidance?” (1978) 10 Ottawa Law Rev. 1; and S. Berger,
“The Application of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause under the Canadian Bill of Rights”
(1978) 24 McGill L.J. 161 (discussing the predecessor provision in the Canadian Bill of Rights,
R.S.C. 1985, App. III).
28
Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]
2 S.C.R. 486 (S.C.C.).
29
Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]
2 S.C.R. 486, at 503 (S.C.C.).
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II. THE MVR PARADOX: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF
SUBSTANTIVE REVIEW
Justice Lamer attempted to circumvent the legitimacy deficit in the
MVR30 by proposing a hybrid which granted section 7 a substantive
interpretation and limited its scope to the institutions of justice. In doing so,
he claimed that substantive review could be undertaken, without adverse
institutional consequences, as long as it was confined to matters within the
justice system. His opinion in the MVR offered a contextual interpretation
to dampen the argument that the intent of the drafters should govern.31
Specifically, Lamer J. reasoned that section 7’s status as the flagship of
the Charter’s legal rights made it unacceptable for that guarantee to have
narrower scope — through a purely procedural interpretation — than the
discrete entitlements protected by sections 8 to 14.32
Due to the prospect of imprisonment, section 7’s entitlements did
not require interpretation in the MVR.33 That enabled Lamer J. to focus
on the fundamental justice clause and to suggest textual support, in its
reference to justice, for his justice-policy distinction. That is how he
rejected the nomenclature of substance and procedure in favour of a
functional division of authority between policy, which is a legislative
prerogative, and justice, which is the domain of the courts. The judiciary
would be estopped from addressing policy questions falling outside the
institutions of justice under Lamer J.’s reading of the guarantee, which
did not allow it. The MVR’s answer to concerns about the legitimacy of
a substantive interpretation was as simple and conclusive as that.34
30

Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]
2 S.C.R. 486 (S.C.C.).
31
More pointedly, he stated that “[i]f the newly planted ‘living tree’ which is the Charter
is to have the possibility of growth and adjustment over time, care must be taken to ensure that
historical materials [such as the evidence of intent] do not stunt its growth”. Reference re s. 94(2) of
the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, at 509 (S.C.C.).
32
Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]
2 S.C.R. 486, at 502 (S.C.C.) (stating that “[i]t would be incongruous to interpret s. 7 more
narrowly than the rights in ss. 8 to 14”; the alternative, “which is to interpret all of ss. 8 to 14 in a
‘narrow and technical’ manner for the sake of congruity, is out of the question”).
33
Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]
2 S.C.R. 486 (S.C.C.).
34
Justice Lamer was adamant that his concept of substantive review was strictly institutional,
and this is how he explained review under s. 7: “[T]he principles of fundamental justice are to be
found in the basic tenets of our legal system. They do not lie in the realm of general public policy
but in the inherent domain of the judiciary as guardian of the justice system”: Reference re s. 94(2)
of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, at 503 (S.C.C.)
(emphasis added).
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This strategy fit the circumstances of section 94(2)’s absolute liability
provision and, with the Court’s reliance on Sault Ste. Marie,35 provided
reassurance that the MVR36 respected the time-honoured pattern of
common law decision-making, albeit under the Charter’s mandate of
constitutionally entrenched rights. If the MVR’s decision to invalidate a
provincial driving offence was relatively uncontroversial, the Court’s
interpretation of the Charter was less straightforward. Whether section 7
would have force exclusively in the criminal justice system, as Lamer J.
hinted but did not unequivocally declare, was unknown.
The jurisprudence which followed the MVR37 and constitutionalized
the mens rea revealed that the distinction between justice and policy was
bogus, and that the elements of a criminal offence unavoidably engage
policy considerations. The shattering of that distinction essentially brought
the constitutional reform of the criminal law to a halt. Two features of this
history are critical to the paper’s purposes. First, the relationship between
fault and punishment was a key variable in the mens rea decisions. That
variable — which took the form of a proportionality principle — created
a connection between the section 7 and section 12 jurisprudence. Second,
as the Court distanced itself from criminal law policy, it paradoxically
become more responsive to a broader conception of the guarantee which,
in rejecting the MVR’s constraints on review, brought the Court into
contact with policy outside the justice system.
1. The Fallibility of the Justice-Policy Constraint
After the MVR,38 the Court took steps to constitutionalize the fault
element before realizing that imposing a minimum mens rea brought the
judiciary directly into the realm of criminal law policy. Before that
realization dawned, Lamer J. described the Court’s mandate to monitor
and review the substantive criminal law in bold, confident terms. In R. v.
Vaillancourt,39 he declared that while Parliament “retains the power to
define the elements of a crime”, the courts have the jurisdiction and
35

R. v. Sault Ste. Marie (City), [1978] S.C.J. No. 59, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1299 (S.C.C.).
Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]
2 S.C.R. 486 (S.C.C.).
37
Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]
2 S.C.R. 486 (S.C.C.).
38
Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]
2 S.C.R. 486 (S.C.C.).
39
[1987] S.C.J. No. 83, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 636 (S.C.C.).
36
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“more important, the duty … to review that definition to ensure that it is
in accordance with principles of fundamental justice”.40 R. v. Martineau
added the “unassailable proposition” that Parliament had “directed” the
Court to review its definitions of the elements of a crime for compliance
with the Charter, and warned that the judges would be “remiss not to
heed this command of Parliament”.41 By Lamer J.’s account, the Charter
had granted the courts a power to review the criminal law which was
near plenary in scope.
On its face, the MVR42 held only that the Charter does not permit
imprisonment without fault. At a broader level of principle, Lamer J.’s
opinion gave constitutional gravitas to a “generally held revulsion against
punishment of the morally innocent”.43 He emphasized that “[i]t has
from time immemorial been part of our system of laws that the innocent
not be punished”.44 From that vantage section 94(2) was unconstitutional
because it had “the potential to convict a person who has not really done
anything wrong”.45 It offended fundamental justice that wholly innocent
individuals could be imprisoned under the legislation.
Parliament’s second degree, felony murder scheme did not threaten
to punish the innocent but provided, instead, that those who cause death
in the commission of prescribed felonies can be prosecuted for murder.
In other words, the mens rea to commit a felony was sufficient to ground
a conviction for murder under section 213 of the Criminal Code.46 In
R. v. Vaillancourt47 and R. v. Martineau48 the Court considered whether
the failure to include a fault element for causing death violated section 7’s
principles of fundamental justice.
40
[1987] S.C.J. No. 83, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 636, at 652 (S.C.C.) (emphasis added). Despite
the bravado, and perhaps because he could not command support for that view, he decided the case on
the more compelling ground that s. 213(d) did not require objective mens rea of the consequences
which attracted the penalties that automatically attached to a conviction for second degree murder
under that provision.
41
R. v. Martineau, [1990] S.C.J. No. 84, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 633, at 643 (S.C.C.).
42
Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]
2 S.C.R. 486 (S.C.C.).
43
Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]
2 S.C.R. 486, at 514 (S.C.C.) (citing Dickson J.’s opinion in R. v. Sault Ste. Marie (City), [1978]
S.C.J. No. 59, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1299 (S.C.C.)).
44
Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]
2 S.C.R. 486, at 513 (S.C.C.).
45
Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]
2 S.C.R. 486, at 492 (S.C.C.) (emphasis added).
46
R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34.
47
[1987] S.C.J. No. 83, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 636 (S.C.C.).
48
[1990] S.C.J. No. 84, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 633 (S.C.C.).
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That is how the MVR’s49 principle of no imprisonment without fault
took the form of a constitutional minimum for mens rea. In R. v.
Vaillancourt50 the Court invalidated the weapons subsection of the Criminal
Code51 provision for felony murder because an individual could be
convicted and punished for second degree murder, even though death
was neither subjectively nor objectively foreseeable.52 Though the mens
rea to commit the felony was an element of the offence, a fault element
for causing death — which is what made section 213(d) a murder offence
— had been eliminated.
Justice Lamer proposed that, in certain cases, a “special mental
element” is a prerequisite to conviction. As he explained, this element
ensures that the accused is morally blameworthy in relation to the
consequences for which he is being punished. Thus it would be unfair,
under section 7’s principles of fundamental justice, for section 213(d) to
stigmatize and punish a person, who is no more than a felon, as a
murderer. In other words, there is a constitutional level or threshold of
moral blameworthiness which must be reached to warrant the stigma
and sentence that attach to convictions for particular crimes. This reasoning
led the Court to conclude in Vaillancourt that the stigma and sentence
attaching to murder generated a constitutional minimum which required
fault in relation to the death element of the actus reus.53
Justice Lamer clearly stated his preference for a constitutional
requirement of subjective fault, but could only attain majority support
for a standard of objective fault.54 Though section 213’s failure to require
objective fault meant that R. v. Martineau could have been decided the
same way, Lamer J. chose to set a more exacting requirement of symmetry

49
Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]
2 S.C.R. 486 (S.C.C.).
50
[1987] S.C.J. No. 83, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 636 (S.C.C.).
51
R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34.
52
At the time, s. 213(d) made it culpable homicide, punishable as second degree murder,
for a person to cause a death in the course of committing certain specified felonies, when a person
used a weapon or had it on his or her person, and death ensued as a consequence: Criminal Code,
R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 213(d).
53
R. v. Vaillancourt, [1987] S.C.J. No. 83, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 636, at 654 (S.C.C.)
(concluding that it is a principle of fundamental justice that “absent proof beyond a reasonable
doubt of at least objective foreseeability, there surely cannot be a murder conviction”).
54
R. v. Vaillancourt, [1987] S.C.J. No. 83, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 636, at 654 (S.C.C.) (stating
his view that a murder conviction cannot rest on anything less than subjective foresight but concluding,
for purposes of decision, that s. 213(d) did not even meet the lower threshold of objective
foreseeability).
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between the actus reus and mens rea.55 Not only did he conclude that the
Charter requires subjective foresight of death, he stated that the fault
requirement follows from the “general principle that criminal liability
for a particular result is not justified except where the actor possesses a
culpable mental state in respect of that result”.56 The Court did not need
to comment further in Martineau on the implications of a subjective
fault requirement under section 7 of the Charter; it was readily apparent
that a baseline of that kind could deny Parliament the authority to
criminalize acts which cause unintended consequences.
Vaillancourt57 and Martineau58 raised the spectre of radical reforms
to the substantive criminal law, but introduced the variables that enabled
the Court to contain the concept of a minimum mens rea. Justice Lamer
explained, in both decisions, that the stigma and sentence for second
degree murder create a disproportionality between the mens rea of the
offence and the punishment imposed. The felony murder provisions
were unconstitutional because the mens rea was too attenuated to
support Parliament’s mandatory minimum for second degree murder.
Justice Lamer maintained that subjective foresight of death must be proved
before an individual can be “labelled and punished” as a murderer, because
the “punishment must be proportionate to the moral blameworthiness of
the offender.”59 As will be seen below, this concept of proportionality
brought the jurisprudence into contact with the standard that was emerging
under section 12; it also enabled the Court to avoid the consequences of
Martineau in the subsequent cases. For the time being, it was unclear
where the Court’s constitutionalization of fault might lead. Under Lamer
J.’s reading of the MVR,60 section 7’s principles of fundamental justice
were concerned not only with the absence of a fault element, but with its
55
[1990] S.C.J. No. 84, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 633 (S.C.C.). At stake in this case was s. 213(a),
which made second degree murder available as a charge when a person committed any one of
certain specified felonies, intended to cause bodily harm, and the act resulted in death: Criminal
Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 213(a).
56
R. v. Martineau, [1990] S.C.J. No. 84, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 633, at 645 (S.C.C.) (emphasis added).
57
R. v. Vaillancourt, [1987] S.C.J. No. 83, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 636 (S.C.C.).
58
R. v. Martineau, [1990] S.C.J. No. 84, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 633 (S.C.C.).
59
In particular, he stated that “[t]he effect of s. 213 is to violate the principle that
punishment must be proportionate to the moral blameworthiness of the offender”, R. v. Martineau,
[1990] S.C.J. No. 84, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 633, at 645 (S.C.C.); he also declared that “a special mental
element with respect to death is necessary before a culpable homicide can be treated as murder” and
that “special mental element gives rise to the moral blameworthiness that justifies the stigma and
punishment attaching to a murder conviction” (at 646).
60
Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]
2 S.C.R. 486 (S.C.C.).
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sufficiency as well. Following Martineau, it seemed as though the Court
was poised to impose its view of moral blame on the criminal law.61
Meanwhile, dissenting opinions in both cases exposed the seamlessness
of any distinction between justice and policy. In Vaillancourt McIntyre J.
wrote that defining offences and setting punishment are matters of policy
which belong to the legislatures, not the courts. Though an unintentional
death might not be thought of as murder, Parliament was entitled to take
a harsh approach to felony murder.62 Martineau63 also provoked a dissent
by L’Heureux-Dubé J., who emphasized that fault and punishment are
policy matters which, under the MVR’s64 own logic, should rest with
Parliament.65 She complained that it is not the Court’s job to second-guess
Parliament’s policy choices in this area, and pointed out that a conviction
under section 213(a) of the Criminal Code66 required a high degree of
moral blame.67

61
See J. Stribopoulos, “The Constitutionalization of ‘Fault’ in Canada: A Normative Critique”
(1999) 42 Crim. L.Q. 227, at 251 (stating that “[a] number of the statements made by the court in
both Vaillancourt and Martineau lead to the inescapable impression that the Supreme Court was
poised to elevate the need for subjective mens rea into a requirement for all criminal offences”).
See also R. Cairns-Way, “Constitutionalizing Subjectivism: Another View” (1990) 79 C.R. (3d) 260
(stating that R. v. Martineau, [1990] S.C.J. No. 84, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 633 (S.C.C.) and R. v. Logan,
[1990] S.C.J. No. 89, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 731 (S.C.C.) invite further lengthy, complex and unpredictable
litigation challenging sections of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, on constitutional grounds,
and create the potential for the judicial reformation of the substantive criminal law).
62
R. v. Vaillancourt, [1987] S.C.J. No. 83, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 636, at 663 (S.C.C.)
(dissenting opinion).
63
R. v. Martineau, [1990] S.C.J. No. 84, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 633 (S.C.C.).
64
Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]
2 S.C.R. 486 (S.C.C.).
65
As she explained:
Policy considerations in Canada as well as in other jurisdictions have inspired legislation
that considers objective foreseeability sufficient as the minimum mens rea requirement for
murder....
Striking down the legislation simply because some other scheme may be preferable
would be an unwarranted intrusion into Parliament’s prerogative …The Charter does not
infuse the courts with the power to declare legislation to be of no force or effect on the basis
that they believe the statute to be undesirable as a matter of criminal law policy.
R. v. Martineau, [1990] S.C.J. No. 84, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 633, at 681 (S.C.C.) (emphasis added).
66
R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34.
67
R. v. Martineau, [1990] S.C.J. No. 84, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 633, at 664 (S.C.C.) (detailing
five respects in which a person must be found blameworthy before a conviction can be entered
under this section). She also discounted the factor of stigma in determining the constitutionality of
an offence (at 678-79). See also R. Cairns-Way, “Constitutionalizing Subjectivism: Another View”
(1990) 79 C.R. (3d) 260, at 263 (expressing concerns about the contingency of the idea of stigma as
a variable in determining the constitutionality of criminal offences).
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In suggesting that the symmetry principle might demand subjective
foresight of consequences, Martineau68 had the potential to subvert a
variety of Criminal Code69 provisions. After flirting with a minimum
mens rea, the Court balked when that requirement threatened to supplant
Parliament’s conception of criminal responsibility. Paradoxically, Lamer J.’s
principle of proportionality spared the Court from interfering with
Parliament’s authority to decide what conduct is punishable.
Second degree murder fit the circumstances of a proportionality
principle because conviction carries a mandatory minimum sentence of
life imprisonment.70 In the cases which followed Martineau,71 the Court
realized that section 7’s requirement of proportionality could be met —
despite the lack of symmetry between the actus reus and mens rea —
whenever the sentence was a matter of discretion. Individualized sentencing
meant that there was no gap between the constitutional requirement of
fault and the punishment which would be imposed. That reasoning not
only brought the section 7 analysis closer to the underlying concepts of
section 12, but in doing so effectively re-interpreted Vaillancourt72 and
Martineau as cases which required a minimum mens rea because the
consequences of a murder conviction were uniquely so severe.
The limits of section 7’s minimum mens rea were tested in several
cases which were decided in the early 1990s. Among them are two which
stand out as tipping points for the constitutionalization of fault: R. v.
DeSousa73 and R. v. Creighton.74 Both times, the Court rejected the
concept of a threshold for fault under section 7 and in doing so handily
68

R. v. Martineau, [1990] S.C.J. No. 84, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 633 (S.C.C.).
R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34.
70
See Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 235 (establishing life imprisonment as the
statutory punishment for first and second degree murder), and s. 745 (defining life imprisonment,
for purposes of first and second degree murder, respectively, as 25 and 10 years’ imprisonment
without parole).
71
R. v. Martineau, [1990] S.C.J. No. 84, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 633 (S.C.C.).
72
R. v. Vaillancourt, [1987] S.C.J. No. 83, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 636 (S.C.C.).
73
[1992] S.C.J. No. 77, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 944 (S.C.C.).
74
[1993] S.C.J. No. 91, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.). See also R. v. Tutton, [1989] S.C.J.
No. 60, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1392 (S.C.C.) (failing to decide, though not under the Charter, whether
criminal negligence is based on a subjective or objective standard of fault); under the Charter see
R. v. Wholesale Travel Group Inc., [1991] S.C.J. No. 79, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 154 (S.C.C.) (per Lamer
C.J.C., indicating that negligence is the constitutional minimum when an accused faces imprisonment
under the Competition Act [Combines Investigation Act], R.S.C. 1970, c. C-23); R. v. Nova Scotia
Pharmaceutical Society, [1992] S.C.J. No. 67, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 606 (S.C.C.) (declining to specify a
constitutional requirement of subjective mens rea, in the context of the Combines Investigation Act);
and R. v. Hundal, [1993] S.C.J. No. 29, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 867 (S.C.C.) (also rejecting subjective
mens rea).
69
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found that the principle of proportionality was satisfied. Assuming no
imprisonment without fault, Creighton made it clear that, short of a
mandatory minimum, no sentence or stigma would fail the VaillancourtMartineau standard. The decision also made it plain that the Court had
little further interest in monitoring Parliament’s definitions of crime.
The unanswered question in Martineau75 was whether section 7 permits
Parliament to punish an individual for causing unintended consequences.
Any number of offences which attach additional penalties to conduct that
causes specified consequences were at risk of being invalidated under this
view of the guarantee’s reach.76 In that context, the Court’s conclusion
in DeSousa,77 that the Charter does not require that degree of symmetry
between fault and punishment, was pivotal. There, Sopinka J. stated,
unambiguously, that once the mens rea for a predicate offence is satisfied,
section 7 requires no more than objective foresight of the prohibited
consequences. Specifically, he found that section 269’s offence of
unlawfully causing bodily harm does not require subjective foresight of
the prohibited consequence.
Whether by way of clarifying Martineau78 or in retreating from it,
Sopinka J. stated that providing there is “a sufficiently blameworthy
element in the actus reus to which a culpable mental state is attached”,
the Charter does not require a symmetrical fault element for every
aspect of an unlawful act, including its consequences.79 To impose such
a demand, he remarked, would “substantially restructure current notions
of criminal responsibility”.80 With those words, the Court acknowledged
the impact section 7 could have on the substantive criminal law, and
signalled its unwillingness to entertain challenges to a family of offences
which penalize unintended consequences.
Rather than further the concept of a constitutional minimum, the Court
deferred to Parliament’s judgment that those who engage in unlawful
conduct should be punished for the unintended consequences of their
75

R. v. Martineau, [1990] S.C.J. No. 84, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 633 (S.C.C.).
R. v. DeSousa, [1992] S.C.J. No. 77, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 944 (S.C.C.) and R. v. Creighton,
[1993] S.C.J. No. 91, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) do just that. Both are predicate offence provisions:
a conviction under s. 269 requires an initial unlawful act followed by a consequence of bodily harm
(Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 269); a conviction for unlawful act manslaughter requires
an initial unlawful act followed by a consequence of death (Criminal Code, s. 225(5)(a)).
77
R. v. DeSousa, [1992] S.C.J. No. 77, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 944 (S.C.C.).
78
R. v. Martineau, [1990] S.C.J. No. 84, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 633 (S.C.C.).
79
R. v. DeSousa, [1992] S.C.J. No. 77, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 944, at 965-66 (S.C.C.) (emphasis
added).
80
R. v. DeSousa, [1992] S.C.J. No. 77, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 944, at 967 (S.C.C.).
76
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action.81 As Sopinka J. explained, “[n]either basic principles of criminal
law, nor the dictates of fundamental justice require, by necessity, intention
in relation to the consequences of an otherwise blameworthy act.” 82
Martineau83 may have required subjective fault for a second degree murder
conviction, but section 269 was not the same. There, the commission of
a predicate offence was sufficiently blameworthy to hold the accused
responsible when his unlawful act resulted in bodily harm. DeSousa’s84
conclusion that a lesser and non-symmetrical degree of fault would
satisfy section 7’s standard of fundamental justice put brackets around
Vaillancourt85 and Martineau as decisions which rested on the
constitutionally lethal combination of felony murder and a mandatory
minimum sentence of life imprisonment.86 By contrast, there was nothing
significant about the stigma of a section 269 conviction. More to the
point, DeSousa demonstrated that few offences would fail proportionality’s
standard for punishment where sentencing was at the discretion of the
trial court.87
The principle of a minimum mens rea stalled indefinitely when the
Court held, in R. v. Creighton, that section 7 does not require a fault
element for death in the case of unlawful act manslaughter.88 Creighton
achieved a degree of resolution after the Court had fussed, in a series of
decisions, over the relationship between the Charter and the criminal
law.89 There, La Forest J. waffled between the two plurality opinions
81

R. v. DeSousa, [1992] S.C.J. No. 77, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 944 (S.C.C.).
A defendant is not morally innocent “simply because a particular consequence of an
unlawful act was unforeseen by [the] actor”. R. v. DeSousa, [1992] S.C.J. No. 77, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 944,
at 967 (S.C.C.).
83
R. v. Martineau, [1990] S.C.J. No. 84, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 633 (S.C.C.).
84
R. v. DeSousa, [1992] S.C.J. No. 77, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 944 (S.C.C.).
85
R. v. Vaillancourt, [1987] S.C.J. No. 83, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 636 (S.C.C.).
86
Meanwhile, the Court upheld Parliament’s mandatory sentence for first degree murder
in R. v. Luxton, [1990] S.C.J. No. 87, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 711 (S.C.C.). To explain why the sentence
was not grossly disproportionate, Lamer J. relied, in part, on the Charter’s requirement of subjective
fault for murder.
87
See D. Stuart, “The Supreme Court Drastically Reduces the Constitutional Requirement
of Fault: A Triumphant Pragmatism and Law Enforcement Expediency” (1993) 15 C.R. (4th) 88, at 97
(commenting on R. v. DeSousa, [1992] S.C.J. No. 77, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 944 (S.C.C.) and observing
that the Supreme Court “appears to have pragmatically decided to call a halt to the full review of
fault requirements earlier envisaged by Chief Justice Lamer”).
88
R. v. Creighton, [1993] S.C.J. No. 91, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.).
89
See R. v. Creighton, [1993] S.C.J. No. 91, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.); R. v. Tutton,
[1989] S.C.J. No. 60, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1392 (S.C.C.); R. v. Wholesale Travel Group Inc., [1991]
S.C.J. No. 79, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 154 (S.C.C.); R. v. Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical Society, [1992] S.C.J.
No. 67, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 606 (S.C.C.); R. v. Hundal, [1993] S.C.J. No. 29, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 867 (S.C.C.).
82
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before joining McLachlin J. and denying Lamer C.J.C. a majority.
Justice McLachlin’s opinion rejected the proposition that symmetry is a
principle of fundamental justice,90 and held that objective foresight of
bodily harm suffices, for purposes of the Charter, in manslaughter cases.
Justice McLachlin also invoked the Court’s markers of stigma and
punishment to dispose of the proportionality issue; the felony murder
rule was an example of disproportionality, but unlawful act manslaughter
was not.91
Critically, Lamer C.J.C. was unable to command majority support
for the view that symmetry required objective foresight of death. Not
only had the Court retreated from a concept of subjective fault, it had
further diluted the symmetry principle by upholding a homicide conviction
without a mens rea requirement for death. If section 7 did not require
symmetry for a homicide offence, it was unclear when it would ever be
required. In this way the constitutionalization of mens rea effectively
ended with Creighton and its companion cases. 92 Commentators saw
wholesale retreat, if not an about-face, in the post-Martineau decisions.93
Once the Court refused to develop its fledgling concept of minimum
fault, the Charter’s impact on the substantive law would be relegated to
occasional and episodic interventions. Though the defence of intoxication
was constitutionalized under section 7, the ensuing brouhaha showed the

90
R. v. Creighton, [1993] S.C.J. No. 91, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 3, at 53 (S.C.C.). She stated that a
rule must have universal application to be a principle of fundamental justice, and added that the
existence of exceptions to the rule of symmetry meant that it was not constitutionally required by
s. 7’s principles of fundamental justice. As Simon France noted, McLachlin J.’s argument that a
principle of fundamental justice cannot embrace exceptions “is rather puzzling” as it is equally true
of most criminal law principles, and suggests that “constitutional review of aspects of the criminal
law will always be disappointing”. See “Gains and Lost Opportunities in Canadian Constitutional
Mens Rea” (1994-1995) 20 Queen’s L.J. 533, at 549.
91
R. v. Creighton, [1993] S.C.J. No. 91, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 3, at 47 (S.C.C.): “The most
important feature of the stigma of manslaughter is the stigma which is not attached to it”; and, at 48:
“[T]he offence of manslaughter stands in sharp contrast to the offence of murder” because
“[m]urder entails a mandatory life sentence; manslaughter carries with it no minimum sentence.”
92
See also R. v. Gosset, [1993] S.C.J. No. 88, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 76 (S.C.C.); R. v. Naglik, [1993]
S.C.J. No. 92, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 122 (S.C.C.); R. v. Finlay, [1993] S.C.J. No. 89, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 103
(S.C.C.).
93
As Patrick Healy observed: “The trend of the cases shows a court poised to lower the
standard of fault in criminal cases on grounds of policy, and to hold that such policy decisions not
only respect but promote principles of fundamental justice” (emphasis added). See “The Creighton
Quartet: Enigma Variations in a Lower Key” (1993) 23 C.R. (4th) 265, at 279; see also D. Stuart,
“Continuing Inconsistency But Also Now Insensitivity That Won’t Work” (1993) 23 C.R. (4th) 240.
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Court that it entered the policy fray at its own peril.94 And despite
tinkering with the Criminal Code’s95 definition of duress, the Court has
since declined to constitutionalize other elements of the offence or to
subject the substantive law to Charter scrutiny in other contexts.96 To
this day, it is a matter of disappointment to some that the MVR’s97 promise
remains largely unfulfilled.
Despite expansive statements in Vaillancourt98 and Martineau99
about the Court’s mandate under section 7, the constitutionalization of
mens rea was no more than a modest success. In principle, there were
two fundamental problems with the MVR’s100 “constitutional aversion”
to offences which might punish the morally innocent. First, the Court
pushed the boundaries of review by pronouncing on the constitutionality
of Parliament’s concept of moral blame. Inasmuch as the MVR claimed
that the Court would not tread on policy, that is exactly what happened
in Vaillancourt and Martineau. A second problem was that there were
no obvious or identifiable limits on the concept of minimum mens rea.
A symmetrical requirement of fault for every act or consequence that
Parliament made punishable would run judicial interference on a concept
of criminal responsibility that was deeply entrenched in the Criminal
Code.101 By the time R. v. DeSousa102 was decided, the Court had
realized that such an interpretation of section 7 would take review to
places it could not legitimately go.
Even so, the MVR,103 Vaillancourt104 and Martineau105 established a
constitutional minimum for offences which impermissibly attenuated the
94

R. v. Daviault, [1994] S.C.J. No. 77, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 63 (S.C.C.). Parliament responded
with An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (self-induced intoxication), S.C. 1995, c. 32, s. 1; R.S.C. 1985,
c. C-46, s. 33.1(1).
95
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
96
See R. v. Ruzic, [2001] S.C.J. No. 25, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 687 (S.C.C.). See also R. v.
Malmo-Levine, [2003] S.C.J. No. 79, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571 (S.C.C.) (refusing to constitutionalize the
harm principle as an element of the actus reus) and J. Cameron, “From the MVR to Chaoulli v.
Quebec: The Road Not Taken and the Future of Section 7” (2006) 34 S.C.L.R. (2d) 105, at 128-30.
97
Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]
2 S.C.R. 486 (S.C.C.).
98
R. v. Vaillancourt, [1987] S.C.J. No. 83, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 636 (S.C.C.).
99
R. v. Martineau, [1990] S.C.J. No. 84, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 633 (S.C.C.).
100
Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]
2 S.C.R. 486 (S.C.C.).
101
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
102
[1992] S.C.J. No. 77, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 944 (S.C.C.).
103
Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]
2 S.C.R. 486 (S.C.C.).
104
R. v. Vaillancourt, [1987] S.C.J. No. 83, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 636 (S.C.C.).
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mental element. Without per se addressing the question of punishment,
the Court found the provisions unconstitutional because the sentence
which could or would be imposed in each of these cases was fundamentally
unjust: it carried a sentence which, in diluting the fault element, violated
the principle that the punishment and blameworthiness of the accused
must be proportional. In this, Lamer J. took the lead in developing the
Court’s section 7 jurisprudence, as he also did in the section 12 decisions
— which may be one reason why the analysis under both guarantees
bears a close resemblance. After discussing section 7’s journey outside
the criminal justice system, the paper discusses the relationship between
fault and punishment under section 12.
Justice Lamer proposed a conception of section 7 that did not work
well in the setting of the criminal justice system. But nor was the Court
able to withstand the pressure to expand the guarantee beyond the
boundaries of criminal justice. The MVR’s106 theory of review began to
buckle, almost from the start, because other members of the Court did
not accept Lamer J.’s compromise between an all-or-nothing approach to
substantive review. Over his objections, the Court granted the guarantee’s
entitlements a more generous interpretation. Decisions which entertained
claims at large and without connection to the justice system directly
contradicted the MVR and undermined its fundamental assumptions.
Justice Lamer’s warning that the Court should not engage in substantive
review of legislative policy outside the administration of justice was
ignored. In rejecting his conception of the guarantee, this jurisprudence
challenged the foundation for review that had been laid in the MVR.
2. Letting the Institutional Constraint Go
The dichotomy of justice and policy was initally eroded, outside the
mens rea context, by R. v. Morgentaler.107 There, the Court invalidated
the Criminal Code’s108 framework for therapeutic abortions, claimed that
the scheme was procedurally unjust, and declined to address a woman’s
substantive right to seek an abortion. Reviving the substance-procedure

105

R. v. Martineau, [1990] S.C.J. No. 84, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 633 (S.C.C.).
Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]
2 S.C.R. 486 (S.C.C.).
107
[1988] S.C.J. No. 1, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 (S.C.C.).
108
R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34.
106
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distinction which had been spurned in the MVR109 did not alter the fact
that the Court had invalidated Parliament’s abortion policy. In doing so,
Dickson C.J.C. proposed a “manifest unfairness” test110 which subsequently
took the form, in the dissenting opinion of McLachlin J., as she then
was, in Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General),111 of a section
7 prohibition on arbitrary laws. Morgentaler and Rodriguez, which
upheld the Code’s assisted suicide provision, both satisfied the MVR’s
administration of justice criterion; both likewise arose in a criminal
setting. At the same time, both cases invited the Court to disagree with
Parliament’s decision to criminalize certain conduct. As well, the claim
in each rested on a broader concept of entitlement than mere physical
liberty, or freedom from the physical restraint of imprisonment. In
Morgentaler, the Court focused on security of the person to avoid
commenting on the guarantee’s liberty entitlement, and Rodriguez likewise
relied on security, rather than liberty of the person. Writing alone in
Morgentaler, Wilson J. proposed a broad-ranging definition of liberty
which recognized a woman’s right to seek an abortion under section 7 of
the Charter.112 In doing so she placed upward pressure on section 7’s
entitlements by expanding liberty of the person to embrace a right to
make fundamental personal choices, including the right to have an abortion,
free from state interference.113
These and other decisions show how the MVR’s114 institutional
concept of substantive review faltered when the Court began to interpret
section 7’s entitlements clause. The mens rea jurisprudence did not
109
Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]
2 S.C.R. 486 (S.C.C.).
110
R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] S.C.J. No. 1, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, at 72 (S.C.C.).
111
[1993] S.C.J. No. 94, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519 (S.C.C.). This principle later became a source
of deep division within the Court in Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] S.C.J. No. 33,
[2005] 1 S.C.R. 791 (S.C.C.).
112
R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] S.C.J. No. 1, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, at 166 (S.C.C.) (maintaining
that s. 7’s “liberty”, properly construed, grants the individual “a degree of autonomy in making
decisions of fundamental personal importance”). A version of Wilson J.’s definition was adopted
by the Court, some years later, in Blencoe v. British Columbia (Human Rights Commission), [2000]
S.C.J. No. 43, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 307 (S.C.C.).
113
The entitlement in Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] S.C.J. No.
94, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519, at 589 (S.C.C.) followed the majority approach in R. v. Morgentaler,
[1988] S.C.J. No. 1, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 (S.C.C.) and focused on security of the person rather than
liberty of the person (concluding that the prohibition in the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46
on assisted suicide deprived Rodriguez of autonomy of person and caused her physical and
psychological stress in a way that impinged her security of the person).
114
Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]
2 S.C.R. 486 (S.C.C.).
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engage that part of the guarantee, because imprisonment per se violates
liberty of the person. It would not take Lamer J. long to see that the
MVR’s institutional concept of review would not work unless definitional
restrictions were placed on section 7’s primary entitlements. In declining
to comment further on liberty or to consider the meaning of security of
the person, he had deliberately reserved the point in the MVR.115 Though
the attempt would be futile, Lamer J. later wrote two concurring opinions
which fiercely defended a conception of liberty that would shackle its
content to the coercive purposes of the criminal law.
Despite also arising under the Criminal Code,116 the Solicitation
Reference placed the scope of entitlement in issue.117 The question there
was whether a prohibition on solicitation infringed a prostitute’s liberty
to pursue a profession of choice or her security of interest in procuring
the basic necessities of life. The prospect that section 7 might open up to
economic entitlements provoked a vehement response from Lamer J. To
his mind, an expansive interpretation of the guarantee’s first clause
threatened the legitimacy of review. Compliance with the MVR118 and its
focus on the institutions of justice required a restrictive interpretation of
liberty: he was adamant that any other approach would entangle the Court
in institutional transgressions which would compromise the legitimacy
of review.
For that reason, his concurrence in the Solicitation Reference119 urged
rigid adherence to the contours of the MVR.120 He wrote sternly and at
length in an attempt to thwart efforts to enlarge section 7 beyond a mandate
that was strictly focused on the justice system. In particular, he urged
the Court to limit liberty of the person to state interferences with an
individual’s physical freedom.121 The effect of his position was to read
115
Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]
2 S.C.R. 486, at 500-501 (S.C.C.).
116
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
117
Reference re ss. 193 and 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code (Man.), [1990] S.C.J. No. 52,
[1990] 1 S.C.R. 1123 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Solicitation Reference”].
118
Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]
2 S.C.R. 486 (S.C.C.).
119
Reference re ss. 193 and 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code (Man.), [1990] S.C.J. No. 52,
[1990] 1 S.C.R. 1123 (S.C.C.).
120
Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]
2 S.C.R. 486 (S.C.C.).
121
Following lengthy discussion, he summarized his position in these words: “s. 7 is
implicated when the state, by resorting to the justice system, restricts an individual’s physical
liberty in any circumstances”; Reference re ss. 193 and 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code (Man.),
[1990] S.C.J. No. 52, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1123, at 1177 (S.C.C.) (emphasis in original); he added
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the institutional focus of the fundamental justice clause into the definition
of entitlement. Limiting both parts of the guarantee to matters arising in
the administration of justice was imperative, in his view, to preserve that
critical distinction between justice and policy.122
Justice Lamer’s concurrence sounded an alarm and rested on a strained
approach to the text; unlike section 7’s second clause, the entitlements
clause contains no language that remotely refers to, much less targets,
the institutions of justice. Yet he was plainly concerned that the MVR’s123
constraints on review would be disregarded and that the Court would
stray into the realm of pure public policy.124 That is why he wrote with
such urgency to halt any movement toward an expansive interpretation of
section 7’s entitlements.125 For him, the guarantee’s integrity depended
on both clauses receiving an interpretation that was consistent with the
MVR’s theory of review.

that the guarantee is also implicated when the state “restricts individuals’ security of the person by
interfering with, or removing from them, control over their physical or mental integrity” (ibid.).
122
Specifically, he indicated that “the principles of fundamental justice can provide an
invaluable key to determining the nature of the life, liberty and security of the person referred to in
s. 7”, and added that “the restrictions on liberty and security of the person that s. 7 is concerned
with are those that occur as a result of an individual’s interaction with the justice system, and its
administration”; Reference re ss. 193 and 195.1(1) of the Criminal Code (Man.), [1990] S.C.J. No. 52,
[1990] 1 S.C.R. 1123, at 1173 (S.C.C.).
123
Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]
2 S.C.R. 486 (S.C.C.).
124
As he explained, “the confinement of individuals against their will, or the restriction of
control over their own minds and bodies, are precisely the kinds of activities that fall within the
domain of the judiciary, as guardian of the justice system”. In contrast, he added, that “once we
move beyond the ‘judicial domain’, we are into the realm of general public policy, where the
principles of fundamental justice … are significantly irrelevant. … The courts must not, because of
the nature of the institution, be involved in the realm of pure public policy; Reference re ss. 193
and 195.1(1) of the Criminal Code (Man.), [1990] S.C.J. No. 52, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1123, at 1176
(S.C.C.) (emphasis added).
125
Cases in which “economic” claims were advanced include R. v. Edwards Books and Art
Ltd., [1986] S.C.J. No. 70, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713, at 786 (S.C.C.) (per Dickson C.J.C., rejecting a
claim that Sunday closing laws violate s. 7, and stating that he could not accept that liberty in s. 7 is
synonymous with unconstrained freedom or extends to an unconstrained right to transact business
whenever one wishes); and Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 36, [1989]
1 S.C.R. 927, at 1002-04 (S.C.C.) (rejecting a claim that an advertising law violated a corporation’s s. 7
rights, because “a corporation cannot avail itself of the protection offered by s. 7 of the Charter” and
“economic rights as generally encompassed by the term ‘property’ are not within the perimeters of
the s. 7 guarantee”); see also Wilson v. British Columbia (Medical Services Commission), [1988]
B.C.J. No. 1566, 30 B.C.L.R. (2d) 1 (B.C.C.A.) (holding that s. 7 is not confined to freedom from
bodily restraint and, without extending to property or pure economic rights, could include the right
to choose one’s occupation).
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The second decision in B. (R.) v. Children’s Aid Society126 isolated
the Chief Justice and, in rejecting a conception of entitlement based on
freedom from physical liberty, made further inroads on the MVR’s127
theory of review inevitable. The case considered section 7’s requirements
when a minor was removed from parents who refused, for religious
reasons, to allow blood transfusions which were medically necessary.
Though not a criminal case, CAS arose in the administration of justice.
Despite agreeing that there was no violation of fundamental justice,
members of the Court divided on the preliminary question of entitlement.
In the contest to control the meaning of liberty, La Forest J.’s opinion
must be seen as pivotal. He openly and unequivocally rejected a
definition of liberty as “mere freedom from physical restraint”, endorsed
Wilson J.’s definition from Morgentaler,128 and declared that section 7
guarantees each individual’s “personal autonomy to live his or her own
life and to make decisions that are of fundamental personal importance”.129
He did not win majority support, but attracted four votes for that view of
the entitlement.130
Chief Justice Lamer strenuously resisted La Forest J.’s suggestion
that section 7 protects parental autonomy. He demanded that liberty of
the person be limited to encounters with the administration of justice
which place an individual’s physical freedom at risk.131 In doing so he
insisted on a holistic interpretation of the guarantee which would restrict
its entitlements to matters connected with the institutional processes of the
justice system.132 The most revealing parts of Lamer C.J.C.’s concurring
126

[1994] S.C.J. No. 24, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 315 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “CAS”].
Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]
2 S.C.R. 486 (S.C.C.).
128
R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] S.C.J. No. 1, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 (S.C.C.).
129
B. (R.) v. Children’s Aid Society, [1994] S.C.J. No. 24, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 315, at 368 (S.C.C.).
130
To his vote those of L’Heureux-Dubé, Gonthier and McLachlin JJ. were added.
131
In B. (R.) v. Children’s Aid Society, [1994] S.C.J. No. 24, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 315 (S.C.C.)
he introduced a theory of the person, as a corporeal entity, as the connection or linkage between s. 7’s
entitlements. As he explained (at 346-47):
[T]he connection is found in the person himself or herself, as a corporeal entity, as opposed
to the person’s spirit, aspirations, conscience, beliefs, personality, or, more generally, the
expression or realization of what makes up the person’s non-corporeal identity. The right to
liberty, in this context, must therefore be set up against imprisonment, detention or any form
of control or constraint on freedom of movement.
132
Thus he stated that the liberty claim must be one “that may be limited through the
operation of some mechanism that involves and actively engages the principles of fundamental
justice”. B. (R.) v. Children’s Aid Society, [1994] S.C.J. No. 24, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 315, at 339
(S.C.C.). He also explained (at 339) that, “[a]part from a situation in which the state engages the
justice system”, it was difficult to see how those principles otherwise could have application.
127
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opinion expose his fears about the consequences of releasing the guarantee
from the MVR’s133 constraints. Doing so, he stated, “would not only be
contrary to the structure of the Charter and of the provision itself, but
would also be contrary to the scheme, the context and the manifest
purpose of s. 7”.134 For the Chief Justice, the most serious problem was
the absence of limits on the guarantee’s scope and the lack of principled
boundaries on review.135 He fretted that La Forest J.’s definition would
confer constitutional protection on “all eccentricities expressed by
members of our society” and “would inevitably lead to a situation where we
would have government by judges”.136 Ironically, these are the arguments
he dismissed when he gave section 7 a substantive interpretation for the
first time in the MVR.
Justice La Forest continued to batter the MVR137 in Godbout v.
Longueuil (City), which invalidated a rule that required municipal workers
to reside in their employer’s city.138 While six members of the Court
decided the case under the Quebec Charter, three others led by La Forest J.
held that the condition violated section 7 of the Charter. That view,
which was supported by L’Heureux-Dubé and McLachlin JJ., was without
precedent. Not only did the claim pose a free-standing substantive
challenge to the municipality’s resolution, which lacked an interaction
with the justice system, it also asked the Court to enforce an economic
entitlement. Justice La Forest stated that section 7 must be read “in light
of the values reflected in the Charter as a whole, and not just those …

133
Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]
2 S.C.R. 486 (S.C.C.).
134
B. (R.) v. Children’s Aid Society, [1994] S.C.J. No. 24, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 315, at 348 (S.C.C.).
135
The Chief Justice stated:
[S]ince most laws have the effect of limiting a freedom, the same approach could mean …
that a large proportion of the legislative provisions in force could be challenged on the
ground that they infringe the liberty guaranteed by s. 7... It would then be for the courts …
to decide whether or not the freedom invoked was a fundamental freedom ..., whether the
limit complied with the principles of fundamental justice …, or whether the limit was
reasonable and could be justified. … We must keep in mind, first, that what may be
important and fundamental to one person may very well not be to another, including the
judge who hears the case, and second, that by adopting this approach the judiciary would
inevitably be legislating, when this is not its function.
B. (R.) v. Children’s Aid Society, [1994] S.C.J. No. 24, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 315, at 347 (S.C.C.).
136
B. (R.) v. Children’s Aid Society, [1994] S.C.J. No. 24, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 315, at 348 (S.C.C.).
137
Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]
2 S.C.R. 486 (S.C.C.).
138
[1997] S.C.J. No. 95, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 844 (S.C.C.).
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described as ‘legal rights’”,139 and declared, once again, that liberty protects
“the right to an irreducible sphere of personal autonomy wherein
individuals may make inherently private choices free from state
interference”.140 This time, and for whatever reason, Lamer C.J.C. chose
to remain silent and permit La Forest J.’s definition of liberty to stand
unanswered.141
The MVR142 claimed that section 7’s substantive content would be
limited to matters arising in the administration of justice. As the guarantee’s
interaction with the substantive criminal law tapered, other claims began
to look more promising. CAS,143 which had considered section 7 in a
civil setting, was followed by New Brunswick (Minister of Health and
Community Services) v. G. (J.), which would be one of Lamer C.J.C.’s
final opinions.144 There he held that the government’s failure to provide
legal representation to a parent who might lose custody of her children
in a court hearing violated fundamental justice, because she did not have
the opportunity to participate effectively in the hearing. 145 Though the
Chief Justice had rejected the proposition in CAS that section 7 protects
any element of parental liberty unrelated to physical restraint, he avoided
that constraint in G. (J.) by shifting his attention to security of the person.146

139
Godbout v. Longueuil (City), [1997] S.C.J. No. 95, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 844, at 890 (S.C.C.)
(emphasis added).
140
Godbout v. Longueuil (City), [1997] S.C.J. No. 95, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 844, at 893 (S.C.C.).
He added the qualification that the entitlement extends only to matters that are “fundamentally or
inherently personal”, those matters which, in his words, implicate “basic choices going to the core
of what it means to enjoy individual dignity and independence”.
141
He joined the reasons of Major J., which disposed of the appeal under the Quebec
Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, R.S.Q., c. C-12, and otherwise stated his agreement with
the other plurality opinion by Cory J., that “it is unnecessary and perhaps imprudent to consider
whether the residence requirement infringes s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.”
Godbout v. Longueuil (City), [1997] S.C.J. No. 95, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 844, at 855 (S.C.C.).
142
Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]
2 S.C.R. 486 (S.C.C.).
143
B. (R.) v. Children’s Aid Society, [1994] S.C.J. No. 24, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 315 (S.C.C.).
144
[1999] S.C.J. No. 47, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 46 (S.C.C.).
145
New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v. G. (J.), [1999] S.C.J.
No. 47, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 46, at 84-85 (S.C.C.) (concluding that the parent needed to be represented
by counsel for there to be a fair determination of the children’s best interests, and that without the
benefit of counsel she would not have been able to participate effectively at the hearing).
146
Note, in comparison to the Chief Justice’s view of liberty, as a purely corporeal concept,
what he said about security of the person: “As an individual’s status as a parent is often fundamental to
personal identity, the stigma and distress resulting from a loss of parental status is a particularly
serious consequence of the state’s conduct”; New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community
Services) v. G. (J.), [1999] S.C.J. No. 47, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 46, at 78 (S.C.C.).
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The decision was grounded in the administration of justice, but
expanded section 7 by imposing an affirmative duty on the government
to fund legal counsel in certain circumstances. From there the jurisprudence
continued to loosen its connection with the MVR147 in Winnipeg Child
and Family Services v. W. (K.L.)148 which, like Godbout,149 addressed
the content of section 7’s principles of fundamental justice in a setting
entirely outside the administration of justice. Gosselin v. Quebec,150 which
was decided after Lamer C.J.C. retired, was yet another section 7 turning
point. There, Arbour J. wrote a dissenting opinion which charted a radical
path for the guarantee. Daringly, she advocated an interpretation which
would reach matters of social and economic policy, and claimed that
affirmative entitlements could be enforced against government under
this conception of the guarantee.151 Though her view was endorsed only
by L’Heureux-Dubé J., who was soon to retire, Arbour J. had liberated
section 7 from the MVR’s taboo on matters of policy. In doing so, she
validated an entirely different view of entitlement — one which had
been dreaded for years by some, including the drafters, and advocated,
at times fervently, by others.
The MVR’s152 conception of section 7 all but toppled in Chaoulli v.
Quebec, when a plurality opinion by McLachlin C.J.C. and Major J.
held that a provision which prohibited access to private health care
insurance violated section 7 because it was arbitrary.153 Undeterred by
the policy content of the law, the judges did not consider it problematic
147
Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]
2 S.C.R. 486 (S.C.C.).
148
[2000] S.C.J. No. 48, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 519 (S.C.C.). There, the Court was divided on the
question whether fundamental justice required prior authorization, in the form of a warrant, for the
non-emergency apprehension of a child. Once having cited New Brunswick (Minister of Health and
Community Services) v. G. (J.), [1999] S.C.J. No. 47, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 46 (S.C.C.), L’Heureux-Dubé J.
and Arbour J. agreed, without discussion, that the state’s action engaged the parent’s security interest.
Each then proceeded to a discussion of what principles of fundamental justice required in the
circumstances; each did so without noting or commenting on the absence of any link between the s. 7
claim and the administration of justice.
149
Godbout v. Longueuil (City), [1997] S.C.J. No. 95, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 844 (S.C.C.).
150
Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2002] S.C.J. No. 85, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 429 (S.C.C.).
151
See J. Cameron, “Positive Obligations Under Sections 15 and 7 of the Charter: A Comment
on Gosselin v. Quebec (2003) 20 S.C.L.R. (2d) 65.
152
Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]
2 S.C.R. 486 (S.C.C.).
153
Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] S.C.J. No. 33, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791
(S.C.C.). Chief Justice McLachlin and Major J. co-wrote the opinion, and Bastarache J. concurred;
Binnie and LeBel JJ. co-wrote a second plurality opinion, which dissented on the s. 7 question, and
were joined by Fish J. Justice Deschamps wrote separately to prevent any majority opinion on s. 7
and decide the case under the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, R.S.Q., c. C-12.
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that the section 7 claim was free-standing, and had no connection to the
justice system. A regulation which was designed to preserve the integrity
of the public health care system was pure policy, but the plurality opinion
found that it arbitrarily violated the security rights of those who were
denied access to medical services as a result.
Chaoulli’s154 foray into the policy domain contradicted the MVR155
and provoked controversy. Inside the Court, the Binnie-LeBel plurality
opinion dissented in the strongest terms from what it regarded as an
inappropriate intrusion by judges into matters of democratic governance.156
With the seventh member of the panel providing the determinative vote
on statutory grounds, the split exposed a fault line inside the Court. On
one side were judges who were prepared to invalidate legislation falling
outside the MVR’s institutional theory of review; on the other were
those who supported its administration of justice constraint.157 Chaoulli
has been praised some, including by those who advocate a mandate for
section 7 which would include social and economic entitlements. It has
also been denounced by those who were skeptical — from the outset —
of MVR’s promise that review could and would be limited to non-policy
matters falling within the administration of justice.158
This history leads to the unavoidable conclusion that section 7 is in
a state of disarray. The Court has failed to regulate the scope of the
guarantee or give its parameters conceptual coherence. In responding to
claims on a case-by-case basis, the Court has developed an array of
doctrines and tests to manage the question of fundamental justice which
are unrelated to each other, or to an identifiable concept of the guarantee.
These dynamics place section 7 at a juncture which requires that a
choice be made. Reclaiming the conception of review first proposed by

154

Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] S.C.J. No. 33, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791 (S.C.C.).
Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]
2 S.C.R. 486 (S.C.C.).
156
Among other things, the plurality dissent claimed that the debate is not about constitutional
law, but social values, and not an appropriate subject of review, as a result, under s. 7. Chaoulli v.
Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] S.C.J. No. 33, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791, at 863 (S.C.C.).
157
On that issue, the Binnie-LeBel plurality stated that “[i]t will likely be a rare case where
s. 7 will apply in circumstances unrelated to adjudicative or administrative proceedings” and that
“[t]he further a challenged state action lies from the traditional adjudicative context, the more
difficult it will be for a claimant to make that essential link [to the principles of fundamental justice]”;
Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] S.C.J. No. 33, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791, at 877-78 (S.C.C.).
158
For a range of views see B. Ryder, Guest Editor, Symposium on Chaoulli, 44 O.H.L.J.
(Summer 2006) and C. Flood, K. Roach & L. Sossin, eds., Access to Care, Access to Justice: The
Legal Debate Over Private Health Insurance in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005).
155
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Lamer J. in the MVR159 — and rejecting Chaoulli’s160 gesture to broader
policy questions unrelated to the legal system — is one option. Another
approach would relax the constraints on section 7 and allow the guarantee
to address injustices of all kinds, wherever and however they arise.
Finally, it is not too late to reject a substantive interpretation of section 7
and return to a prelapsarian concept of the guarantee solely as a source
of protection against injustices of a procedural nature.

III. THE WAY FORWARD
The potentially unrestrained scope of liberty and security of the
person made it imperative for constraints to be placed on the guarantee’s
interpretation. Justice Lamer recognized the problem inherent in an
indeterminate, all-inclusive approach to entitlement under section 7, but
was unwilling to deny the Charter a role in modifying the criminal law.
Though restricting the guarantee’s content to matters of procedural
justice was the constraint the drafters had in mind, the MVR161 rejected
that option and proposed a form of substantive review which would be
limited to proceedings arising in the justice system.
Justice Lamer’s conception of section 7 offered an intermediate
position between the extremes of all or nothing on substantive review.
As seen above, he proposed a theory with built-in limits which he
thought would ensure that the Court did not interfere with pure public
policy. Yet the attempt to mediate section 7’s content was unsuccessful;
under his approach the constitutionalization of mens rea went too far
and the protection of entitlements outside the criminal law did not go far
enough. The Court’s focus on fault and the symmetry principle placed a
number of Criminal Code162 offences at risk of being invalidated because
the Court disagreed with Parliament’s definition of criminal responsibility.
Constitutionalizing the mens rea quickly brought the Court into conflict
with Parliament’s policy choices in deciding how criminal offences should
be defined and punished.

159
Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]
2 S.C.R. 486 (S.C.C.).
160
Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] S.C.J. No. 33, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791 (S.C.C.).
161
Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]
2 S.C.R. 486 (S.C.C.).
162
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
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Once a substantive interpretation was established, members of the
Court grew restive under the MVR’s163 constraints. Justice Wilson was
quick to embrace a broad, substantive definition of liberty, and La Forest J.
picked up on her initiative in CAS164 and Godbout.165 In each case he
expressed the view that section 7 must be interpreted in light of all the
Charter’s values and not limited by its formal classification as a legal
right. Over time, Lamer J.’s insistence that an institutional constraint be
read into both of section 7’s clauses lacked traction. Not only did it strain
credulity to read the guarantee’s entitlements as limited to constraints on
physical liberty, the claim that the Charter could only address injustices
arising in the legal system was unconvincing.
The Court’s decision to abandon the MVR’s166 administration of
justice constraint was not the answer. An interpretation that empowers
courts to invalidate social and economic policies which are “unjust”
violations of liberty or security of the person is problematic. It is
unsound for the reasons Antonio Lamer gave in the MVR and reinforced
in the Solicitation Reference167 and CAS.168 It is unsound for the reasons
identified by the Binnie-LeBel plurality in Chaoulli v. Quebec,169 as well
as for those offered in Gosselin v. Quebec170 by Justice Bastarache.171 It
is the same problem that was identified when the MVR was decided, and
was answered at that time by Lamer J.’s attempt to place definitional
boundaries around a guarantee which, in terms, was potentially without
limit. The problem with a concept of section 7 that addresses fundamental
injustices whenever and wherever they arise is that review under that
theory of entitlement is indefinite. It is either so broad as to bring the

163
Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]
2 S.C.R. 486 (S.C.C.).
164
B. (R.) v. Children’s Aid Society, [1994] S.C.J. No. 24, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 315 (S.C.C.).
165
Godbout v. Longueuil (City), [1997] S.C.J. No. 95, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 844 (S.C.C.).
166
Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]
2 S.C.R. 486 (S.C.C.).
167
Reference re ss. 193 and 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code (Man.), [1990] S.C.J. No. 52,
[1990] 1 S.C.R. 1123 (S.C.C.).
168
B. (R.) v. Children’s Aid Society, [1994] S.C.J. No. 24, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 315 (S.C.C.).
169
Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] S.C.J. No. 33, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791 (S.C.C.).
170
Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2002] S.C.J. No. 85, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 429 (S.C.C.).
171
There, he insisted — in disagreeing with Arbour J.’s conception of entitlement — that
the “judicial nature” of s. 7 rights could not be ignored without bringing “the legitimacy of the entire
process of Charter adjudication” into question; Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2002] S.C.J.
No. 85, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 429, at 546 (S.C.C.).
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courts routinely into conflict with legislative policy, or so selective in
the claims it protects as to be arbitrary.172
Though the MVR’s173 distinction between justice and policy was
unsound from the start, Lamer J.’s theory of section 7 held a certain
attraction. By limiting the guarantee’s substantive content to the institutions
of the justice system, his concept constrained the scope of review. And
though it was incapable of eliminating the concerns that are inherent in
giving fundamental justice a substantive interpretation, it confined the
range in which those concerns would operate. Though it was less than
persuasive, Lamer J.’s concept of section 7 was strengthened by the
structural argument that the text of the Charter directs attention to the
justice system; the guarantee’s placement under the heading of legal rights
provided further support for the proposition that its content is legal
rather than social or economic in nature.
At the same time, the MVR’s174 distinction between the legal system
and matters of legislative policy failed to explain why section 7 should
have any substantive content at all. In the end, that may be the fatal flaw
of Lamer J.’s theory of review: it was not obvious why the text allowed
a substantive interpretation and then limited that interpretation to the
criminal law. The suggestion that section 7 should privilege injustices
arising in the justice system over all others proved unworkable and
unpersuasive. As the MVR, Morgentaler,175 the second degree murder cases,
Rodriguez176 and Daviault177 all demonstrate, it is difficult to maintain —
on principled grounds — that review under a restricted theory of section 7
is legitimate, or more legitimate, than the alternative of open-ended review.
The text and history do not support a double standard for section 7’s
substantive interpretation.
It is unavoidable that any substantive approach to section 7 is
problematic, whether limited to the criminal justice system or more
open in nature. The Court’s inability to articulate a coherent concept of
172
See J. Cameron, “The Motor Vehicle Reference and the Relevance of American Doctrine in
Charter Adjudication” in R. Sharpe, ed., Charter Litigation (Toronto: Butterworths, 1987) 69, at 89
(explaining this dilemma of interpretation).
173
Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]
2 S.C.R. 486 (S.C.C.).
174
Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]
2 S.C.R. 486 (S.C.C.).
175
R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] S.C.J. No. 1, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 (S.C.C.).
176
Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] S.C.J. No. 94, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519
(S.C.C.).
177
R. v. Daviault, [1994] S.C.J. No. 77, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 63 (S.C.C.).
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review — one which would identify the core of the guarantee and explain
the scope of entitlement — demonstrates that a procedural interpretation
was not an unwise choice. Yet the most powerful argument against a
minimalist conception of section 7 is the one which first succeeded in
the MVR;178 under a procedural interpretation there would be no recourse
for laws that are substantively unfair.
From a certain point of view, the consequences of such a proposal
need not be so draconian. The Court’s section 7 landmarks established
that the Charter demands a relationship of proportionality between fault
and punishment. The trilogy — the MVR,179 Vaillancourt180 and
Martineau181 — invalidated offences which potentially imposed punishment
that was disproportionate to the accused’s blameworthiness. In the MVR,
the offence was unconstitutional because it had the potential to send an
innocent person to jail. The second degree murder provisions were
invalidated in Vaillancourt and Martineau because mandatory life
imprisonment was disproportionate in the case of a person who did not
intend to cause death. Albeit from a different perspective, the Court’s
decision in R. v. Oakes reflects a similar concern.182 There, the Court
invalidated a reverse onus clause because it mandated a conviction —
and punishment — in some circumstances where the accused might have
been blameless.
While the section 7 cases examined the severity of the punishment
to determine the constitutionality of the fault element, the section 12
decisions considered the role of fault in determining whether certain forms
of punishment were cruel or unusual. Though articulated in guaranteespecific language, the section 7 and 12 cases rest, fundamentally, on the
same analysis. And to the extent that is so, section 12 may offer a viable
alternative to substantive review under section 7. The next section
pursues that possibility by considering whether section 12 can fill the
gap arising from any return to a procedural interpretation of section 7.

178
Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]
2 S.C.R. 486 (S.C.C.).
179
Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]
2 S.C.R. 486 (S.C.C.).
180
R. v. Vaillancourt, [1987] S.C.J. No. 83, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 636 (S.C.C.).
181
R. v. Martineau, [1990] S.C.J. No. 84, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 633 (S.C.C.).
182
[1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.).
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IV. SECTION 12: THE CHARTER’S “FAINT HOPE” GUARANTEE183
Section 12, like section 7, had a promising start with the Supreme
Court’s decision, in R. v. Smith, to invalidate Parliament’s mandatory
minimum sentence for importing narcotics.184 The Court’s leading opinion
there, as in the section 7 fault trio, was authored by Lamer J.185 In the
circumstances of an offender who was caught re-entering the country
with seven-and-a-half ounces of pure cocaine in his possession, the
conclusion that section 5(2) of the Narcotic Control Act 186 violated
section 12 was extraordinary. The provision was unconstitutional because
it imposed a minimum of seven years’ imprisonment, without regard to
the quantity of drug imported, and could apply — quite unfairly — to a
person driving home from winter break in the United States, with “his or
her ‘first joint of grass’”.187 Justice Lamer stated that section 12 addresses
the “quality of the punishment” and “is concerned with the effect that
the punishment may have on the person on whom it is imposed”. 188
He introduced the concept of proportionality but emphasized that the
test under section 12 is one of gross disproportionality. Specifically, the
guarantee would only be infringed, he said, when the sentence is “so
unfit having regard to the offence and the offender as to be grossly
disproportionate”.189
Any expectation that the jurisprudence would blossom after Smith190
was dashed by a series of decisions which, together, show that the
Supreme Court regards section 12 as a “faint hope” guarantee of sorts
— one which is available only on rare occasions and in exceptional
circumstances.191 Thus far, claims have succeeded, at the Supreme Court
183

The reference is to Parliament’s “faint hope” clause, which allows those convicted of
first degree murder and subject to life imprisonment for 25 years, to apply for parole after 15 years
in prison, under conditions which are stringent and difficult to meet; see Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985,
c. C-46, s. 745.6(1).
184
[1987] S.C.J. No. 36, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045 (S.C.C.). See K. Roach, “Smith and the
Supreme Court: Implications for Sentencing Policy and Reform” (1989) 11 S.C.L.R. 433.
185
Only Dickson C.J.C. joined Lamer J.’s opinion; Wilson, Le Dain and La Forest JJ.
wrote separately; McIntyre J. dissented; and Chouinard J. did not participate in the decision.
186
R.S.C. 1970, c. N-1.
187
[1987] S.C.J. No. 36, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045, at 1053 (S.C.C.).
188
[1987] S.C.J. No. 36, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045, at 1072 (S.C.C.).
189
[1987] S.C.J. No. 36, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045, at 1072 (S.C.C.).
190
[1987] S.C.J. No. 36, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045 (S.C.C.).
191
See R. v. Luxton, [1990] S.C.J. No. 87, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 711 (S.C.C.); R. v. Goltz, [1991]
S.C.J. No. 90, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 485 (S.C.C.); R. v. Latimer, [2001] S.C.J. No. 1, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 3
(S.C.C.); R. v. Morrisey, [2000] S.C.J. No. 39, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 90 (S.C.C.); and R. v. Ferguson,
[2008] S.C.J. No. 6, 2008 SCC 6 (S.C.C.).
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level, on only two occasions.192 Instead, the jurisprudence has consistently
stated that a violation will only be found “on rare and unique occasions”,
because the test of proportionality “is very properly stringent and
demanding”.193 A lesser standard, Cory J. warned in Steele v. Mountain
Institution, “would tend to trivialize the Charter”.194
As presently understood, section 12’s prohibition against cruel and
unusual treatment or punishment has little vitality as a Charter entitlement.
Rather than require a relationship of proportionality between the offender’s
conduct and the sentence, the Court has focused on disproportionality
and placed a heavy burden on the accused to prove that the punishment
fails that standard. 195 Moreover, and instead of considering the
proportionality between the blameworthiness of an accused’s conduct
and the punishment imposed, the Court considers whether a sentence is
defensible in abstract and global terms.196 It has found that generally,
punishment which is not outrageous, excessive and beyond all standards
of decency for a diverse and indeterminate class of offenders does not
violate section 12.
The Supreme Court’s standard of disproportionality demands reexamination against the objectives of section 12. This is especially so at
this point in time, with mandatory minimums in ascendancy. With the
exception of Smith197 and the second degree, felony murder cases decided
under section 7, the Court has held that mandatory sentences do not offend
the Charter.198 That assumption should be challenged by a concept of
entitlement that focuses on the presence of proportionality, not an absence
192

See R. v. Smith, [1987] S.C.J. No. 36, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045 (S.C.C.), and Steele v.
Mountain Institution, [1990] S.C.J. No. 111, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1385 (S.C.C.).
193
Steele v. Mountain Institution, [1990] S.C.J. No. 111, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1385, at 1417 (S.C.C.).
194
Steele v. Mountain Institution, [1990] S.C.J. No. 111, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1385, at 1417 (S.C.C.).
195
See, e.g., R. v. Morrisey, [2000] S.C.J. No. 39, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 90, at 108 (S.C.C.).
There, Gonthier J. stated that no remedy is available under s. 12 when a punishment is “merely
disproportionate”. The Court must be satisfied, he said, that “the punishment imposed is grossly
disproportionate for the offender, such that Canadians would find the punishment abhorrent or
intolerable” (emphasis in original).
196
The abstract nature of the exercise is highlighted, without being ameliorated, by the
Court’s “reasonable hypothetical” analysis. In principle, the purpose of reasonable hypotheticals is
to enable the Court to invalidate a sentencing provision which could result in gross disproportionality
for third parties not before the Court. Yet R. v. Smith, [1987] S.C.J. No. 36, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045
(S.C.C.) is the only decision that led to a conclusion that the plight of conjectural third parties
required the Court to invalidate a mandatory minimum.
197
R. v. Smith, [1987] S.C.J. No. 36, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045 (S.C.C.).
198
See R. v. Luxton, [1990] S.C.J. No. 87, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 711 (S.C.C.); R. v. Goltz, [1991]
S.C.J. No. 90, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 485 (S.C.C.); R. v. Morrisey, [2000] S.C.J. No. 39, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 90
(S.C.C.); and R. v. Ferguson, [2008] S.C.J. No. 6, 2008 SCC 6 (S.C.C.).
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of disproportionality, and considers whether the punishment imposed is
excessive in the circumstances of the particular individual who has been
convicted. Whether and in what circumstances Parliament is entitled to set
harsh sentences to promote general deterrence, retribution or denunciation
— at the expense of objectives which relate to the circumstances of the
accused — should be dealt with under section 1. The purpose of section
12 should be to identify impermissible gaps between fault and punishment;
from there, further questions about the justifiability of a mandatory floor
should be addressed under section 1. There, it is open to the government
to show why a sentence that is disproportionate under section 12
nonetheless satisfies section 1’s proportionality test, once Parliament’s
broader policy objectives in enhancing the penalty or adopting a mandatory
minimum are taken into account.
A re-conceptualization of section 12 cannot be undertaken here, and
nor is this the occasion to address the status of mandatory sentences.199
This paper’s concern is with the MVR’s200 failure to state a viable concept
of section 7 and the search for an alternative venue for criminal law
review under the Charter. From that perspective, its limited objective is
to demonstrate that, at least where the fault element has been attenuated,
a substantive interpretation of section 7 may be unnecessary. In this regard,
it is significant that the punishment was a key variable in the section 7
jurisprudence which stated a constitutional minimum for mens rea, and
that fault has been a key variable in the assessment of proportionality
under section 12. Though the test of breach is strict, the Court’s decisions
accept, in principle, that punishment which is excessive in relation to fault
violates the Charter’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
In Luxton, for instance, the Court rejected the claim, which was
raised under sections 7 and 12, that Parliament’s first degree felony
murder provision was unconstitutional because it imposed a mandatory
minimum of 25 years’ life imprisonment.201 Chief Justice Lamer held
that Parliament was entitled to treat all offenders with equal severity,
199

For a comprehensive discussion, from a variety of perspectives, see E. Sheehy, Guest
Editor, Symposium on Mandatory Minimum Sentences: Law and Policy (2001) 39 Osgoode Hall L.J.
200
Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]
2 S.C.R. 486 (S.C.C.).
201
R. v. Luxton, [1990] S.C.J. No. 87, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 711 (S.C.C.), and see note 70
(explaining the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 provisions which set the punishment for first
degree murder). While Luxton upheld then s. 214(5)(e), dealing with the predicate offence of
forcible confinement, R. v. Arkell, [1990] S.C.J. No. 86, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 695 (S.C.C.), which was
decided the same day, upheld s. 214(5) under s. 7 of the Charter. See also R. v. Paré, [1987] S.C.J.
No. 75, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 618 (S.C.C.) (upholding the distinction between first and second degree murder).
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and without regard to the relative blameworthiness of individuals.
Specifically, he found that the punishment satisfied proportionality;
citing Martineau,202 he stated that subjective foresight of death is required
for every murder conviction, and that the moral blameworthiness of the
offender is “markedly enhance[d]” where forcible confinement results in
death.203 The Chief Justice elaborated that “[t]his is a crime that carries
with it the most serious level of moral blameworthiness, namely subjective
foresight of death,” and that the penalty accordingly “is severe and
deservedly so”.204 To summarize, the punishment did not violate section
12 because subjective mens rea, the highest degree of fault, was required
for a conviction.
Other decisions confirm that fault is a key variable in the section 12
analysis. In R. v. Goltz, Gonthier J. upheld a mandatory sentence of seven
days’ imprisonment for driving while prohibited.205 The high threshold
of gross disproportionality was not crossed, he said, because the accused
“knowingly and contemptuously violated the prohibition”.206 The offender
was blameworthy in his own right, and reasonable hypotheticals did not
direct a different disposition. It is also instructive that McLachlin J., as
she then was, dissented in Goltz, because the mandatory minimum could
prevent the Court “from reaching a fair result” and “indeed require
the judge in some cases to impose a sentence which is grossly
disproportionate”.207 This could occur in situations where a person was
relatively blameless in driving while prohibited. R. v. Pontes, which
brought the constitutionality of a driving offence to the Court a third
time, further embedded the relationship between fault and punishment in
the jurisprudence.208 The case, which focused on whether the offence
created an absolute or strict liability offence and was decided under
section 7, held that the Motor Vehicle Act209 created an absolute liability
offence and that “no person is liable to imprisonment for an absolute
liability offence.”210 There was no violation of section 7 because the
202

R. v. Martineau, [1990] S.C.J. No. 84, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 633 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Luxton, [1990] S.C.J. No. 87, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 711, at 722 (S.C.C.).
204
R. v. Luxton, [1990] S.C.J. No. 87, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 711, at 724 (S.C.C.).
205
[1991] S.C.J. No. 90, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 485 (S.C.C.).
206
R. v. Goltz, [1991] S.C.J. No. 90, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 485, at 513 (S.C.C.).
207
R. v. Goltz, [1991] S.C.J. No. 90, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 485, at 531 (S.C.C.). Chief Justice
Lamer and Stevenson J. joined her dissent.
208
R. v. Pontes, [1995] S.C.J. No. 70, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 44 (S.C.C.).
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R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 288.
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R. v. Pontes, [1995] S.C.J. No. 70, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 44, at 68 (S.C.C.).
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provision, when read alongside the Offence Act,211 did not place offenders
at risk of imprisonment. Pontes showed, once again, the symbiosis of
fault and punishment in the section 7 and 12 jurisprudence.
Subsequent decisions in R. v. Morrisey212 and R. v. Latimer213 also treat
moral blameworthiness as an aspect of the disproportionality analysis.
Morrisey tested the constitutionality of a mandatory minimum of four
years for negligently causing death in the use of a firearm. In upholding
the punishment, Gonthier J. repeatedly called attention to the level of
blameworthiness the offence required and concluded, without difficulty,
that no matter who the accused is, a floor of four years for this offence
was not disproportionate. In particular, he stated that “[a]lthough less
morally blameworthy than murder, criminal negligence causing death is
still morally culpable behaviour that warrants a response by Parliament
dictating that wanton or reckless disregard for the life and safety of others
is simply not acceptable.”214 Justice Arbour dissented, though without
invalidating the provision, to express her concern that the “inflationary
floor” might be disproportionate in individual circumstances. Citing
McLachlin J.’s statement in Creighton,215 that “the sentence can be and
is tailored [in manslaughter cases] to suit the degree of moral fault of the
offender,” she declared that “principles and practice reject pigeonhole
approaches and favour a disposition that is sensitive to all the circumstances
of every individual case.”216 And in R. v. Latimer, the Court emphasized
the fault element in explaining why life imprisonment for second degree
murder does not violate section 12.217
The relationship between fault and punishment in this jurisprudence
has been recognized and discussed by Kent Roach, who is critical of the
Supreme Court’s propensity to cite the presence of a fault requirement
211
212
213
214

R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 305.
[2000] S.C.J. No. 39, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 90 (S.C.C.).
[2001] S.C.J. No. 1, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Morrisey, [2000] S.C.J. No. 39, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 90, at 118 (S.C.C.) (emphasis in

original).
215

R. v. Creighton, [1993] S.C.J. No. 91, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Morrisey, [2000] S.C.J. No. 39, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 90, at 132 and 139 (emphasis in
original). Chief Justice McLachlin joined her opinion.
217
R. v. Latimer, [2001] S.C.J. No. 1, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.). The s. 12 standard
requires the Court to consider the gravity of the offence, the personal characteristics of the offender
and the particular circumstances of the offence. In discussing the gravity of the offence, the Court
stated (at 40) that “it cannot be denied that second degree murder is an offence accompanied by an
extremely high degree of criminal culpability”. The Court added (at para. 84): “In this case,
therefore, the gravest possible consequences resulted from an act of the most serious and morally
blameworthy intentionality.”
216
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— as required by section 7 — to support the conclusion that mandatory
punishments do not violate section 12.218 Yet his critique does not reject
fault as one of the variables in the proportionality analysis. To the contrary,
Roach supports individualized fault as the benchmark against which the
proportionality of punishment should be measured under this guarantee.
The difficulty, from his point of view, is that the Court has relied on the
presence of a fault element to uphold mandatory sentences. Not only is
fault an abstract rather than individualized concept under this approach,
but the presence of a fault element has been relied upon to make it
virtually impossible to show disproportionality under section 12.
Section 7 and section 12 each have their own problems. The conclusion
reached in earlier sections of the paper, that the Court’s conception of
section 7 is irreparably incoherent, led to the proposal that the jurisprudence
return to a procedural interpretation of the guarantee. It does not follow,
though, that the Charter should no longer play a role in reviewing the
criminal law. The goal of this discussion has been to consider whether
the relationship between fault and punishment can be decided, in future
cases, under section 12. In other words, the question is whether the
minimum mens rea cases can be restated as a principle that section 12’s
requirement of proportionality will be violated when the fault element is
too attenuated to support the sentence imposed.
The difficulty is that, at best, section 12 is little more than a faint hope
guarantee. Whether read conjunctively, disjunctively or compendiously, the
references to “cruel” and “unusual” invoke memories of a bygone era
when physical barbarity and extreme forms of corporal punishment were
part of the criminal law’s artillery. Perhaps swayed by the text and
history of a guarantee that suggested a narrow focus, the Court has
given section 12 an interpretation which has crippled the entitlement.
The meaning of cruel and unusual should not be stuck in that history,
but should be determined — afresh — by section 12’s underlying values.
Instead of taking that approach, the gross disproportionality test has
displaced a concept of proportionality which would examine the
relationship between the blameworthiness of the accused and the prescribed
punishment. It is particularly troubling, in this regard, that the Court’s
response to mandatory minimums takes decontextualization to new heights
by consistently upholding measures which impose punishment on the
218
K. Roach, “Searching for Smith: The Constitutionality of Mandatory Sentences” in
E. Sheehy, Guest Editor, Symposium on Mandatory Minimum Sentences: Law and Policy (2001)
39 Osgoode Hall L.J. 367.
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basis of a statutory abstraction, and without reference to the circumstances
of the offender. Under the current standard, the threshold for breach is
so high as to be insurmountable.
This paper has explored the Court’s conception of section 7 in the
first 25 years of the Charter, and examined alternatives to a substantive
interpretation of the guarantee. In terms of the substantive criminal law,
a minimum mens rea has been section 7’s primary contribution to
the Charter jurisprudence. The foundational cases — the MVR,219
Vaillancourt220 and Martineau221 — stand for the proposition that certain
punishments cannot be imposed in the absence of a constitutionally
required fault element. Section 12 can support the same conclusion
because both guarantees are concerned with the relationship between
fault and punishment; while section 7 has been more immediately
concerned with the sufficiency of the fault requirement, section 12 is
directed, in terms, to take the measure of the punishment. Whether the
fault is sufficient depends on the punishment which follows upon
conviction, and whether the punishment is permissible depends on
whether the sentence is proportionate to the accused’s blameworthiness.
The Charter’s prohibition against cruel and unusual treatment or
punishment is the preferred venue for claims which consider whether
there is a relationship of proportionality between fault and punishment.
The problem arises where the fault element is too attenuated in relation
to the punishment that attaches to conviction. In circumstances of
imprisonment without fault or a mandatory prison term which is not
calibrated according to the accused’s fault, the punishment was
impermissible under section 7. It would and should be unconstitutional, for
the same reasons, under section 12. Shifting that aspect of proportionality to
the punishment guarantee would retain a role for the Charter and the
criminal law. In doing so, the shift would provide a focus and a context
which has been lacking under section 7, but will direct the section 12
jurisprudence and at the same time avoid the problems spawned by the
MVR.222 The section 7 jurisprudence demonstrates that the scope for a
minimum mens rea is and should be narrow; otherwise, as the Court
discovered, the judges faced the prospect of substituting their concept of
219
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fault for that chosen by Parliament. Still, and despite the importance of
setting boundaries around the Court’s authority to review criminal law
policy, those which are currently in place under section 12 are too
restrictive. A more extensive discussion of the guarantee must be deferred
to another time and place; the point for present purposes is that section
12 can stand in for section 7 in cases which test the proportionality
between fault and punishment in the criminal law.
Ending substantive review under section 7 would bring conceptual
clarity back into the section 7 jurisprudence. Some claims would be lost
under a procedural interpretation of the guarantee and others would
survive, but be redirected to other provisions of the Charter.223 In this
way the problems associated with a substantive interpretation of section 7
will be avoided, without abandoning Charter review of the criminal law.
There is no need, in cases of overlap between sections 7 and 8, to
duplicate the analysis and find a violation under both guarantees. 224
Likewise, the cases which challenged bail provisions should be tested
under section 11(e) and not under section 7. 225 By the same token,
decisions dealing with the presumption of innocence should be decided
under that provision, and not under section 7.226 Nor, in discussing the
criminal law, can other guarantees outside the framework for legal rights
— such as the fundamental freedom and section 15 — be forgotten.
Finally, claims which test the relationship between fault and punishment
should be addressed by section 12. What will remain is section 7’s vital
purpose — as the source of additional procedural entitlements in the
justice system — such as full answer and defence.227 That, in brief
outline, is what the Charter could look like if the Court were to adopt a
procedural conception of section 7.
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V. CONCLUSION
Early in the Charter’s history, the late Antonio Lamer proposed a
concept of section 7 which had the potential for significant impact on
the substantive criminal law. This view of section 7 and of the Charter’s
interaction with the criminal law made headway in an important trio of
cases, and then faltered. Justice Lamer’s approach, which reserved a
substantive interpretation of the guarantee for the institutions of justice,
failed to hold the Court’s support over time: its selective focus on the
justice system proved unworkable and — in the larger scheme of questions
about what is or is not unjust — idiosyncratic as well. Decision by
decision, the Court skirted around the MVR’s228 institutional constraint
until little is left, today, of Lamer J.’s core assumptions: that justice and
policy are readily separable, and that the legitimacy of review is
unassailable, but only when the substantive content of the guarantee is
limited to the justice system.
These dynamics lead to a conclusion that it was unwise for the
Court to grant section 7 a substantive interpretation in the MVR.229 With
only a few decisions that enforce a substantive concept of fundamental
justice in the criminal law, and no clear authority for substantive social
or economic entitlements under the guarantee, it is not too late to reverse
course and return to what the drafters intended, which is an entitlement
of procedural scope and content. Within the criminal law, that approach
would leave the existing section 7 jurisprudence on procedural entitlements
untouched and shift other claims to the Charter’s issue-specific legal rights
guarantees. After the changes two gaps would still remain; a remedy
would no longer be available under section 7 for injustices in the sphere
of social and economic policy, nor would the guarantee entertain claims
that the criminal law is substantively unfair. As has been argued throughout
the paper, neither is an appropriate subject of review under section 7. To
the extent a remedy is required, it must be sought and found under other
Charter guarantees.
Justice Lamer’s fault trilogy spotted and addressed a proportionality
gap between fault and punishment in the substantive criminal law. Though
the Court must exercise caution when reviewing Parliament’s criminal
law policy, some provisions invite intervention, and a disparity between
228
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an offender’s blameworthiness and the sentence imposed is one of them.
For that reason, this paper does not suggest that the fault trio was
incorrectly decided; its position, instead, is that the section 7 cases
rested on a question of proportionality which could and should have
been addressed under section 12. In other words, a disproportionate
relationship between fault and punishment should be an ongoing concern
of the Charter’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. For
that to happen, the section 12 jurisprudence must be released from the
constraints of the gross disproportionality test, which has made it next to
impossible for challenges to mandatory minimums and other departures
from individualized justice to succeed.
The task of reforming the standard of breach for section 12 remains,
but is deferred for now. The first step, in developing a coherent relationship
between the Charter and the criminal law, is to return section 7 to its
original conception and shift substantive issues about the proportionality
of fault and punishment to section 12. Such a step would preserve the
validity of the section 7 fault trio, retain a place for substantive review of a
more focused nature under section 12 of the Charter, and fundamentally
alter the scope and function of section 7.

